Ukraine, May 2022

Part I

“’Si vis pacem, para bellum’ is a Latin adage that is at least 1,500 years old, which translates to, ‘If you want peace, prepare for war.’ This truism has guided many political and military leaders for centuries and is the motto of numerous military units.”

I picked this paragraph from an article I read, and the statement reflects another wrinkle in the conflict between Ukraine and Russia. The global effects are expanding considerably, and one must ask if there is another potential site for armed conflict. We must be prepared, at least to reduce the chance of another violent conflict.

I also am reminded of two songs from years ago: “I ain’t gonna study war no more” and “War, what is it good for? Absolutely nothing.” These two can be laid in opposition to the opening statement. The real question is not that one or the other is “wrong” but that war is an unfortunately common activity among human beings and various societies. I believe the first paragraph is correct and the “proof”, suspect as it may be to some, is that we haven’t engaged in a major conventional or global nuclear war. All the major powers which have engaged in violent conflicts largely have limited themselves to conventional weapons with an occasional outlier using chemical ones. If our military does not study war “no more” we will be unprepared for any conflict, unable to deter it at any level because of our perceived weakness. While war can settle some issues, the cost is very high. Some conflicts are “unavoidable”, short of abject surrender by one side, and we should expect there will be more outbreaks of violence. Our preparation should focus on protecting our national interests above all other considerations, and one of those is avoiding getting engaged unnecessarily in a violent conflict with another nation, especially a major power.

As the struggle continues in Ukraine it has become clear that Russia has scaled back its attempts to conquer all of Ukraine and instead focused on the eastern portion. The change in direction reflects in part that the Russian leadership, for one reason or another, had not “studied” war well, leading to the enormous difficulties in conducting its original operations. I am not certain the failures around Kviv represent a true strategic and operational defeat as much as they reflect poor preparation. The 7 P’s indicate: poor prior planning predicts piss-poor performance.”

As I wrote in earlier postings on this conflict, it struck me, and still does strike me, that Russia’s ambitions still revolve around an “autonomous” region in Lugansk and Donetsk and establishing an overland link to Crimea. I think Russian success, a necessary component of Putin’s current position, is defined by holding those eastern portions and incorporating them into Russia itself. It is not a matter of justice or morality. National interests take over both as a conflict deepens and the costs, human and material, rise. The current success Russia has had underscores this judgment. Putin cannot afford complete failure and while Zelenskyy certainly would prefer to hold on to all Ukrainian territory, ultimately it seems unlikely he can force Russia to abandon its gains.

Although Russia has tried to consolidate its efforts in the east, moving the threats away from Kviv has allowed the Ukrainians to do the same. Even the dangers to Odessa have faded. Similarly, concerns about fighting in between Moldova and Transnistria, had Russian ground forces reached their borders, have disappeared. An occasional missile or air attack in western Ukraine serves only as a reminder to Ukraine that Russia still has capabilities.

The escalation in the attacks with “dumb” artillery is both an example of Russian frustration and also a deterioration of the numbers of precision munitions available. While it is likely Russia can produce a large amount of the former, the latter require a more complex production line. The grinding part of the conflict is shaping up, exemplified by the prolonged battling over the factory. Russian generals are not stupid and have studied history. They will recall the defense of Stalingrad (Volgograd) in 1941-1942 and the cost in lives and material. Close-in fighting requires a different mindset and blasting buildings into rubble does not aid the offense as much as one may conclude from images of blown up buildings. Movement is degraded and many options exist for the defenders to execute an ambush, taking a toll on the advancing infantry now without armor support or indeed with armor caught up in the maze and taken out with anti-armor weapons, mines, or simply damage from the debris and rendered ineffective. That Ukrainian forces have withdrawn from the factory does not mean close-in fighting is over. Even though some experts have noted that the terrain in the east is more open to maneuver, in this kind of modern conflict maneuver is less critical than it was 20 or 30 years ago. Modern surveillance and stand-off weapons with high degrees of accuracy degrade the value of rapid maneuver. Additionally, the numerous villages and towns still provide positions suitable for ambush or at least targeting. This conflict is not World War II in microcosm.

It is not clear how long Russia can sustain this kind of fighting where the advantages lie with the defender. It takes special training and unit cohesion, something lacking in conscription forces unless there is a prolonged and intense effort to build the relationships which are necessary to sustain the morale of the troops under enormous stress and integrate their actions. Even at the squad or platoon level, unit cohesion and the proper use of the various weapons available at that level, including communications and surveillance, are vital to success. American experiences in Falluja and other built-up areas highlight their importance. Information available does not suggest Russian forces are up to the task of managing these requirements. The result of failure is not just a lack of progress on the ground but in heavy casualties, not just the dead, but in some ways worse, the wounded. A man returning home missing a limb or with a blown-up face has a more immediate impact on domestic support than a closed casket. Just as Russia attempted to hide the casualties incurred during the invasion of Afghanistan, she may try to hide the wounded and dead. In today’s environment, despite the lack of reliable statistics, it will not prove possible.

To stay in the fight the Russian population must be mobilized as well. While Gen. Milley has said the war is likely to continue for a very long time, I do not concur. High intensity fighting can be maintained only for a short time. The troops at the front must be relieved for rest and replenishment. They are not cardboard figures who can be shifted around a map. Reinforcements must be brought in, but as the drain continues those arriving will be forced to engage quickly. I do not see that happening with conscripts. If there is much of a pause it will help the Ukrainians at least as much as the Russians, if not more. As the Russians consolidate control in the east, it is more likely the fighting will die down and the stress on the Russian population will diminish though not disappear. The Russian army can create a defensive network to seal off the areas she wishes to control and eliminating any remaining forces. Unlike Chechnya where the indigenous population hated the Russian incursion, many Ukrainians have fled and there is a significant number currently in Russia who can return to rebuild. The resources in Lugansk and Donetsk also are important to Russia, allowing her to use them to help rebuild.

What of Ukraine? As long as the West is willing to send equipment it is likely Ukraine can keep fighting. Although its population is substantially less than that of Russia, I have outlined some of the important issues of morale and supply which will play important roles. Ukraine’s supply lines are intact and her morale high, allowing her to bring in more willing fighters, even if not trained well. Fighting on the defense is easier than being on offense and although Zelenskyy speaks of tossing the Russian forces out, the current state of affairs likely will depend more on Russian fatigue than Ukrainian capacity. The problem for Ukraine is what is outlined above. If the Russians can seal off the two regions, Ukraine will have to shift to the offense, and her capabilities there are very limited.

The US is sending advanced artillery and ammunition to Ukraine to use against the Russians. While it certainly is our hope this artillery will not be used against Russia itself, most of the supply routes coming across the border from Russia can be hit, especially if drones are providing targeting information. This kind of interdiction alone will weaken Russian resolve and fighting ability. Combined with the artillery will be air defense systems, placed far enough ahead or around the batteries to take out aircraft threatening them. It is not clear, yet, what weaponry will be used, but as the West spends billions of dollars in assistance to Ukraine, it seems a necessary step to provide such systems. All the training required to use these systems effectively will lead to “advisors” being present, putting at least some of our servicemen at risk. As the head of the Department of Defense said recently, if the president gives the order to send American advisors into Ukraine to assist with training, we will. We can expect that the Russians will retaliate, to try to cause American casualties. What then? Do we escalate further? Similar practices were used in other proxy wars but it also led to our involvement in Vietnam, the proverbial toe in the water approach which leads to fuller direct engagement. Casualties caused us to back out of Lebanon and Somalia. Which road will we follow, especially with the rhetoric being used by our side? It seems unlikely we would “abandon” Ukraine. We would install better defenses which likely would cause Russian casualties. And then what happens? An additional concern is that the West will have less interest in helping Ukraine shift to the offense if the Russians are successful in closing off the eastern regions. An offense is very difficult and costly in men and weapons, as the Russians have learned. I do not believe the West will give Zelenskyy carte blanche.

My speculation on events in Ukraine is meant to point out what I view as a reasonable cause for concern, that we will continue to walk into the “Big Muddy”, as that song described so well. I do have concern that the enormous amount of money it is costing us as taxpayers is based more on emotional support for Ukraine and on anti-Russian sentiment rather than on  a cold-blooded analysis not simply of how the matter plays out there but on our own position and vulnerability at home and abroad. As we struggle with inflation, supply chain issues, and rising debt, not to mention all the other matters before us, the emotional uplift from seeing Ukraine “be successful” has pushed aside legitimate questions about our involvement. Answers should be provided by the ones in charge of the decision process. All Americans, of whatever persuasion or political bias, viewed our lengthy involvement in Iraq and Iran with dismay. What is our, not Zelenskyy’s, end-game in Ukraine? What are the people in charge thinking about deeper involvement? How much more support in money and weapons are we willing to give?

None of what I have written is meant to say Russia invading Ukraine was legitimate, but taking that position does not mean Russia did not have its rationale. The separatist fighting in Lugansk and Donetsk had to end. Russian miscalculation was huge and could prove catastrophic not just to Russia and Ukraine but globally. It will take very cool heads to act to protect our national interests as well as to assess what other nations may deem in their own interests and try to take advantage of the current situation by moving aggressively elsewhere, threatening elements of our national security.

What does all the commentary above have to do with the opening quotation? Our national interests must be OUR priority even if it means not giving Ukraine what it wants. The speed of military conflict has increased markedly in recent decades. Preparing to launch attacks can be measured in minutes in the case of missiles or days rather than weeks or months in the case of conventional warfare. Preparedness is critical and having that preparation known to potential opponents is as important a deterrent as having a nuclear arsenal, indeed in some ways more important since it inhibits expanding a very limited conventional conflict from to a nuclear war. If Ukraine had prepared seriously for war, at least as a possibility, Russia may have acted differently. By allowing the separatist fighting to continue for nearly eight years in Lugansk and Donetsk, Ukraine showed itself unprepared for full engagement in crushing the separatists, for executing a winning strategy to end the fighting. She failed to anticipate deepening Russian eventual involvement with conventional forces. Had Ukrainian army forces been thrown into that fight shortly after it broke out eight years ago, it must be considered that the fighting there would have ended and Russia given no reason to attack. Had Russia sent troops in, the fighting possibly would have been limited to the eastern regions. While it is impossible to know what might have happened, it is the obligation of the military and political leadership to ponder possible actions. We do not know what the Ukrainian government was considering but we do know our ambassadors were involved in changing the leadership and Zelenskyy did not acknowledge the threat Russia posed. He did not heed the intelligence we gave him, to prepare properly and tell the Russians he knew what was coming. There could be other layers involved, such as fearing his own population would feel he was being the aggressor or that he was taunting Russia, but ultimately he would have been acting on the defensive anyway. He was subduing the violence in his own country, in those eastern regions, a responsibility every leader must acknowledge and address.

Our own conventional preparedness has diminished considerably recently. The intended “peace dividend” from withdrawing from Afghanistan and Iraq has not led to better preparation against a near–peer nation like China, which likely will involve the Navy, Air Force, and Marines more than the Army. Our infrastructure will take a very long time to gear up to support the intensity of combat we should be anticipating. Our military leadership should be intensely focused on how we will win a conflict and currently I do not have that impression, based on a number of different sites I read or on my own sense of history. While all democracies are slow to get into war, a very good thing, the current state of affairs indicates a “come as you are” war, largely short, very violent, and consuming enormous quantities of ammunition and people. It has been reported that Ukraine expends in just one day a week’s worth of supplies arriving in Ukraine. We should expect no less should we become engaged somewhere. But it appears we do not have the logistical backing anymore, either in the form of available rapid transport or in manufacturing which can gear up rapidly.

Our leaders must be thinking strategically, not emotionally. Some of the actions recently taken by China, Russia, Iran, etc., are "rational" but do represent dangers to the United States if not countered. China, with a huge economy, despite its difficulties and publishing a good deal of false information about its internal affairs, has made enormous strides for the betterment of its people in the past 20 years. Given the areas of likely conflict, her supply lines will be very short. Because she will not need long distance transportation, she can afford the kind of buildup in forces which create options in a number of local arenas. The only optimism I have is in her continued attempts to end, to zero out, the pandemic. The lockdowns in China are stimulating pushback from the general population and slow her manufacturing. Had she pressed ahead despite the human costs attributable to the pandemic it is possible she would be further ahead militarily and economically and with less internal dissent. It is “rational” to realize that a 2% death rate from the pandemic could mean 20+ million dead in her population of 1.3 billion, to say nothing of the number hospitalized or out of work due to illness. The restrictions, the lockdowns, appear to continue to be necessary in the view of the leadership, but we have no information on how effective these measures are. Maybe conditions are worse than reported. It is not at all clear if the lockdowns have accomplished anything meaningful in stemming the number of deaths or illnesses and hospitalizations, but it does appear to have slowed her economy. Yet China has not stopped her military buildup and now is looking north as well as south.

The real danger to the West and to the US in particular rises not from whatever the ultimate outcome is for Ukraine but what threats have emerged which we have not addressed. I am not in favor of abandoning Ukraine entirely. We are in it up to our ankles, but I hope fervently we go no further. I support the Administration’s stated position there will be no American boots on the ground, despite misstatements by our President, but with advisors helping train the Ukrainians on sophisticated equipment which normally takes months to handle properly in combat, I believe we will learn at some point a number of our people have been killed or injured. I fear the language both political parties are using, as though we will have Russians charging into New York City next week if we don’t become more engaged, or that our goals actually are to break Russia. Thought about coldly, Ukraine just isn’t that important to our security or the security of Western Europe, certainly given the extent of NATO’s reach and power.